Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) by Wrenn, Harry
STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) 
ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB82114 
AUTHOR: 
Harry Wrenn 
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division 
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM 
COMPLIMENTS O F  
DATE ORIGINATED 11/02/82 
DATE UPDATED 12/08/82 




On June 29, 1982, the United States and the Soviet Union began new 
negotiations on controlling strategic nuclear weapons, termed Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START!. The Reagan Administration's basic approach is to 
seek deep cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals. 
START raises a number of issues: 
-- Will the Administration's proposal lead to 
meaningful reductions? 
-- How does the START proposal relate to the Admini- 
stration defense programs and strategic doctrine? 
-- Are there alternatives which better serve U.S. 
interests? 
-- What are known or likely Soviet reactions? 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
START: Description and Evolution 
The Reagan Administration's START proposal envisions two steps towards 
arms reductions (though not necessarily two separate agreements). In the 
first phase, the Soviet Union and the United States would reduce strategic 
missile warheads to about 5,000 on no more than 850 intercontinental 
land-based and sea-based missjles (ICBMs and SLBMs). No more than half of 
these warheads could be on ICBMs. In the second phase, the aggregate missile 
throw weight (i.e., the useful payload potential of a missile booster) would 
be equalized at a level no greater than the aggregate throw weight of the 
present U.S. ICBM force (approximately 4 million pounds). 
According to the Administration, these proposals would require the 
following reductions: 
To reach the limit of 5,000 deployed strategic missile warheads, the 
Soviet Union would have to eliminate 2,400 warheads, and the United States, 
2,452. 
To reach the limit of 850 strategic missiles, the Soviets would have to 
eliminate 1,498 missiles, and the United States, 746. 
To achieve the 2,500-warhead sub-ceiling on ICBMs, the Soviets would have 
to reduce their currently deployed ICBM warheads (5,500) by 3,000. In 
contrast, the United States would not be required to reduce the number of 
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currently deployed ICBM warheads (2,152) because they total less than 2,500. 
However, the United States would have to reduce the current number of 
warheads deployed in SLBMs (5,300) by 2,452 not to exceed the 5,000 overall 
warhead ceiling. There would not be a similar reduction in the number of 
Soviet warheads deployed on SLBMs, because their total is currently below 
2,500. 
If the missile throw weight limit were set at or near the current U.S. 
level of approximately 4 million pounds, the Soviet Union would have to 
sacrifice approximately 7 million pounds of its current throw weight total af 
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The Evolution of START 
START'S Deginnings are to be found in the demise of SALT I1 (Strategic 
Arms Limitations Talks), and the positions candidate Reagan and many of his 
supporters took during that process. Reagan deemed SALT I1 to be "fatally 
flawed." With like-minded critics, he a'rgued that the agreement would merely 
codify the arms race and not actually reduce the threat posed by strategic 
nuclear weapons; that SALT I1 could not be confidently verified; that it 
would concede the U.S.S.R. a major and threatening advantage in ICBMs; and 
that it would leave the U.S.S.R. in a position to further increase its 
strategic advanEage when the agreement expired in 1985. Reagan believed that 
the United States had agreed to this "unequal bargainw because it was 
negotiating from a position of strategic inferiority. From this he Concluded 
that for the immediate future the United States must look to a stronger 
defense program for its security and only subordinately to strategic arms 
control. He did, however, leave the door open to negotiations once the 
United States had taken steps to remedy its strategic deficiencies. 
After assuming office, President Reagan Confirmed the rejection of SALT 11 
and began a substantial arms build-up (though he has ultimately agreed that 
the United States will "not undercutw the tetms of SALT I1 as long as the 
Soviets exercise similar restraint.) But he also indicated a readiness to 
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negotiate a new treaty that would provide for deep reductions. He initiated 
a comprehensive review of arms control policy "to learn the lessons of the 
past in order to achieve more lasting progress in the future." 
Subsequently, Europe and the United States both saw the growth of popular 
movements strongly critical of Administration policy with regard to nuclear 
weapons. In Europe, this took the form of an "anti-nuclearn movement opposed 
to NATO plans to deploy new intermediate range nuclear systems on European 
soil. In the United States, there were demands for a complete "freeze" on 
all nuclear weapons deployments. These new political forces appear to have 
played a significant part in inducing the Administration to move more quickly 
beyond study and into actual negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
The first initiative came in November 1981, when the Administration 
proposed the "zero option" formula for limiting intermediate range nuclear 
forces (INF) in Europe, by which the U.S. proposes to scrap plans for new 
missiles (Pershing I1 and Ground Launch Cruise Missiles) in Europe if the 
Soviets take out all existing missiles in the U.S.S.R. targetted on Western 
Europe. [See CRS Issue Brief 81128: NATO Theater Nuclear Forces: 
Modernization and Arms Control.] Since then, the Administration has also 
taken new initiatives in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) 
that have been going on between NATO and the Warsaw Pact since 1973. During 
the winter and spring of 1982, the overall strategic arms control program 
took shape, and it was made public by the President in an address at Eureka 
College on May 9. 
The START Proposal 
The notion that shapes the Administration's START proposals is that the 
most important weapons to control and reduce are those that are potential 
first strike weapons, i.e., that can quickly destroy hardened targets like 
mi.ssile silos. Of special concern is the Soviet Union's force of large 
ICBMs, which many believe have acquired the capability to destroy the U.S. 
ICBM force in a. first strike, giving rise to the "window of vulnerabilityt* 
problem. There is also the m o r e '  general consideration that the less 
vulnerable the missiles of both sides, the smaller the temptation of either 
power to launch them preemptively in a crisis. Consequently, in the START 
prOpOSalS, missiles are included while bombers are not, since the former can 
strike quickly while the latter take several hours to reach their targets and 
are essentially retaliatory. Also, since SLBMs are currently less lethal 
against hard targets than ICBMs, the special sub-ceilings are only included 
for ICBMs. The Administration justifies formulating a proposal that requires 
larger Soviet reductions by noting that the Soviet Union has a larger number 
of destabilizing (i.e., first strike) weapons. 
The two-phase approach to START has lost some of its currency as the 
negotiations have proceeded. It reportedly derived from inter-departmental 
bargaining within the Administration over the terms of its initial 
negotiating proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of 
Defense seem to have favored a new approach to arms control in which the 
"unit of account" would be throw.weight rather than launchers a s  in SALT. 
Former Secretary of State Haig reportedly argued successfully for an opening 
proposal more consistent with past practice on grounds that this would be 
more acceptable to Soviet negotiators. The U.S. proposal thus concentrates 
first on trying to lower the number of missiles and warheads to equal levels 
CRS- 4 IB82114 UPDATE-12/08/82 
while reserving the more difficult question of equalizing throw weight for 
later. The two phases are conceived as parts of "a single negotiation", 
however, and though the door is left open to a first phase agreement, the 
Administratioc reportedly envisions only one treaty. 
More details of the Administration's START position have been reported in 
the press as negotiations have proceeded, and there is evidence of 
flexibility, especially as regards weapons such as cruise missiles and 
bombers which are not included in the original U.S. proposals. Reportedly, 
the Administration would be willing to limit long-range bombers to current 
levels (but just what types of aircraft these levels might include is not 
clear, though apparently it will insist that Soviet Backfire bombers, which 
have a limited capacity to strike the United States but were not counted 
under SALT, be included in these ceilings). The Administration has also 
shown willingness to discuss cruise missiles (though ground-launched cruise 
missiles currently fall under the rubric of the INF talks mentioned above.) 
Nevertheless, the U.S. START position remains incomplete. When the 
Administration announced its START proposal in May 1982, it acknowledged it 
had yet to work out positions on important matters such as verification and 
missile reloads. Critical choices still lie ahead for both co'untries, a s  
each unveils and refines its position and responds to counter-initiatives. 
This could slow the pace of negotiations. On the other hand, the two chief 
negotiators, Edward Rowny and V.P. Karpov, know each other and the issues 
well, and many thorny technical matters -- definitions, counting rules, and 
the like -- were resolved during the SALT negotiations, and will be carried 
over to START. 
The issue of "linkage" merits mention. The Reagan Administration has 
decided to proceed with strategic arms negotiations despite Soviet behavior 
in Afghanistan, Poland and elsewhere. This is a significant departure from 
the position that arms control should be used as carrot and stick t o  moderate 
inappropriate Soviet behavior. Whether the Administration perseveres in this 
approach is probably contingent upon the extent to which the U.S.S.R. engages 
in future activities that provoke strong U.S. public condemnation. 
Analysis of U.S. Proposals 
Summarized below are the major criticisms of the Administration's START 
proposals and the Administration's public responses. Criticisms fall into 
three categories: 
-- Some see the proposals as unrealistic, either 
because they are lacking in significant components 
or because they are founded on incorrect assumptions; 
these critics argue that such problems raise serious 
questions about the sincerity of the Administration's 
approach. 
- - For different reasons, others see the proposals as 
failing to offer a real prospect for meaningful 
arms control; these critics argue that START'S 
framers have not thoroughly understood certain 
intractable problems that became evident in the 
SALT process. 
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- - Yet others see an agreement based on START as 
undesirable; these critics argue that a START 
agreement might destabilize rather than stabilize 
the strategic nuclear situation; some also argue 
that START is inconsistent with general Reagan 
Administration defense policy which seeks a rapid 
build-up in the U.S. nuclear capability. 
(1) Administration Negotiating Sincerity 
A major criticism is that the proposals are one-sided. START puts the 
greater burden of reductions on the Soviet Union, and permits the U.S. to go 
ahead with all of its currently planned counterforce-capable strategic 
systems, requiring reductions only in older systems that would have to be 
retired in several years anyway. It permits the deployment of large 
quantities of ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles) and SLCMs 
(submarine-launched cruise missiles) that for the moment have no Soviet 
counterpart. 
Critics doubt Moscow's willingness to seriously consider neutralizing its 
own strength in ICBMs and begin competing from a position of weakness in 
other areas, and to "trade the present for the futurew by cutting into its 
existing forces in an effort to stop a U.S. build-up that is only now getting 
underway. These critics wonder whether in drawing up its proposals the 
Administration gave sufficient attention to the divergent interests of the 
two parties. The Soviet Union and the United States have different security 
requirements, make different assumptions about how they are to be met, and 
consequently, for quite legitimate reasons, have developed asymmetric force 
structures. Practical expectations for negotiation requires that t9ese 
differences be taken into account in some fashion. In this regard, equality 
of sacrifice may approach equality of result as a factor in arms control. 
The Administration's response is two-fold. First, it points out that its 
proposals focus on those weapons generally considered to be the most 
destabilizing; at the same time, it has expressed willingness to discuss the 
other systems in the strategic arsenal if Moscow is also willing to do so. 
Second, it sees Moscow as perfectly capable of recognizing and defending its 
own interests in the negotiations and argues that, therefore, U.S. 
negotiators ought to elucidate positions that advance U.S. interests. An 
ancilliary advantage is presumably that a one-sided opening bid will signal 
Soviet leaders that the current Administration is not so eager to gain 
agreement that it will sacrifice vital U.S. security interests. 
A second criticism made of the START proposals is that they contain no 
provisions for verification. This is a special concern since START places 
new burdens on monitoring capabilities. By changing the unit of account from 
something that is relatively difficult to conceal (e.g., silos and other 
missile launchers) to something less visible (e.g., missiles themselves, 
deployed warheads, and missile throw weight), the monitoring and verification 
problem becomes much more complex. The Administration's response is that 
this is a matter still under internal discussion, and one which is relatively 
incidental this early in the negotiations. It has indicated, however, that 
it will insist upon some form of on-site Verification to supplement national 
technical means (NTM) . 
A third criticism of the START proposals is that they are based on 
"incorrect assumptionsn about the strategic balance. Debate continues over 
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Administration claims that the Soviet Union now holds important strategic 
advantages including a capability to eliminate the U.S. Minuteman force with 
a first-strike. Some experts suggest that this vulnerability is a 
theoretical one without practical significance. If this is the case, then 
large reductions in Soviet ICBMs may not be required and a major rationale 
for the Administration's START proposal is thus undermined. The 
Administration finds the evidence of U.S. strategic vulnerability to be 
persuasive with important implications for U.S. force structure and 
modernization plans. 
These three criticisms are cited as evidence that the Administration's 
START proposals are nothing more than a ruse to mollify critics and 
side-track arms control negotiations while the United States rearms. These 
critics see the outlook for arms control based on current policy as further 
clouded by other factors. The Soviets may prefer to wait and see whether 
popular anti-nuclear sentiment succeeds in softening the U.S. position. 
Critics also fear that the U.S. strategic build-up will increase the appetite 
of Soviet military planners, whose demands are more likely to be honored as 
their favor is courted during the coming Soviet succession struggle. 
The Administration's response is that START is a negotiable proposal with 
a good chance for producing a useful arms control agreement. It argues that 
flagrant Soviet intransigence would adversely affect Western and Third World 
public opinion, presumably a development Soviet leaders would prefer to 
avoid. The Administration does not see time as being on the Soviet side. It 
also posits a Soviet desire to preempt a major U.S. arms build-up which, 
given the exorbitant cost of new weapons, could be costly for both sides, but 
especially for the Soviet Union, already under serious economic strain. 
Unrest among Soviet nationalities and in Eastern Europe only adds to Soviet 
hopes for a period of calm in its superpower relations, in the Administration 
view. The Administration does not deny the priority it places on defense 
policy and the need for a defense build-up, but contends that useful arms 
Control can proceed within this framework. It also argues that the school of 
thought exemplified by its critics, though Well intentioned, has been tested 
over the past decade and in practical effect reduced the U.S. position from 
strategic strength to inferiority. 
(2) Promise for Useful Arms Control 
Other critics, while not necessarily questioning the intentions of the 
Administration,'feel that START is not likely to lead to useful arms Control 
because it does not reflect an understanding of the limitations of the SALT 
process. Arms control analysts point to several such limitations, of which 
the following are the most salient. 
First, START like SALT fails to address significant "gray areav problems. 
It ignores an intimate relationship between theater and strategic forces that 
bears directly on Soviet calculations of the nuclear threat. This deficiency 
is generally acknowledged, and some Administration Spokesmen have suggested 
the possibility of merging the START negotiations with the negotiations on 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) currently under way in Geneva. 
Second, some argue that START like SALT adopts the wrong unit of account, 
Critics point out that to limit only deployed warheads preserves significant 
U.S. advantages in stockpiled warheads. The Administration's response is 
that the START categories are distinct improvements over SALT, and that 
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whatever the merits of adopting other units of account, START'S two-phase 
approach offers the best chance of producing a balanced strategic arms 
control agreement. 
Third, some argue that START like SALT is inadequately framed to deal. with 
the threat posed by evolving weapons technology. As SALT I1 failed to 
contain MIRV technology, so START could fail with regard to cruise missiles 
and the improving counterforce capabilities of SLBMs. START supporters 
acknowledge the difficulty of constraining weapons technology, but add that a 
beginning has to be made somewhere and that the START proposal provides the 
means to channel dangerous developments in ways that will strengthen rather 
than undermine strategic stability. 
( 3 )  Implications for Stability 
The third set of criticisms focuses on the extent to which an agreement 
based on the START proposals would promote stability in the strategic 
relationship. Stability has been assessed in different ways. [See article 
by Leon Sigal cited in the bibliography.] It can derive from each side's 
confidence in the survivability of its second strike capability (termed 
Strategic stability). Stability also results when neither side has reason to 
expect an attempt at a preemptive strike (termed Crisis stability). Another 
type is arms race stability, which exists when neither side is concerned that 
the other is trying to build weapons that threaten its second strike 
capability or crisis stability. Administration critics have argued that an 
agreement based on START could seriously erode some or all of these factors. 
Some have pointed out that a START agreemhnt would not halt the arms race. 
Under START, the United States would be able to modernize each leg of the 
strategic triad with MX, Trident submarines, Trident I .and 11, cruise 
missiles, and B-1 and Stealth bombers. Presumably, the Soviets would be 
allowed similar "non-destabilizingM deployments. The Administration response 
is that there is no quick fix to the nuclear dilemma and that a START 
agreement would help deescalate the arms race and promote crisis stability. 
It stresses that a START agreement would lessen the number of weapons 
deployed and required for nuclear security. It notes furt,her that U.S. 
modernization programs go hand-in-hand with negotiations, being a convincing 
demonstration of U.S. will to maintain secure second strike forces with or 
without an arms control agreement. 
Some argue that START focuses too much on equalizing numbers while 
neglecting the more important goals - of balancing force asymmetries and 
preventing destabilizing surprises. The Administration response is that 
instability already exists resulting directly from unequal numbers of 
counterforce-capable ICBMs. 
A related argument made against START is that reductions, while good in 
principle, increase the "breakout" danger. A relatively small number of 
hidden weapons could dramatically alter the strategic balance as the overall 
totals decline- The Administration's response is that this problem argues 
persuasively for strong verification measures but not against the 
desirability of reductions. 
Another problem posed by the specific reductions formula called for in the 
START proposals is that it does not solve the ICBM vulnerability problem. 
Currently, the Soviets are able to target each U.S. land-based missile silo 
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with about four warheads; under the proposed formula that ratio would not 
diminish and could well increase to 6 to 1 or even 12 to 1 ,  depending on the 
particular force mix each side chooses under the START ceilings. [For an 
analysis of this aspect of the START proposals, see CRS White Paper: 
President Reagan's START Proposal: Projected U.S./U.S.S.R. Ballistic 
Missiles Forces, by A.A. Tinajero, June 9 ,  1982.1 The Administration 
acknowledges this defect, but argues that a survivable basing mode for ICBMs 
can be devised that alleviates the vulnerability problem. 
In the debate over START, other measures have been considered, some of 
which might be adopted if there is not a very high degree of confidence in 
the survivability of a new ICBM basing mode. One is to put a higher portion 
of U.S. warheads on ICBMs than currently appears likely under START. But 
since this would mean fewer submarines at sea, the task of Soviet 
anti-submarine warfare may be eased, with the possible net effect of 
increased SLBM vulnerability, currently the most survivable leg of the U.S. 
strategic triad. Another option would be to deploy ABMs, though this would 
require changes to the ABM Treaty. Some critics argue that a dangerous new 
arms race might begin if the ABM limit: in the current agreements were 
significantly loosened. Another more radical solution is to forego 
altogether land-based ICBMs and place all warheads in air-launched or 
submarine launched systems. Extensive arguments are made about the merits of 
each option, which are not covered here. [see CRS Report 81-222F, Assessing 
the Options for Preserving ICBM Survivability, by Jonathan M e d a i a ,  September 
1981; and archived CRS Issue Brief 77046, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force 
Options, by John Collins and Elizabeth Severns; last update 01/04/82.] The 
foregoing simply highlights the point that START does not solve the ICBM 
vulnerability problem and that the Administration has pursued other measures 
to Solve that problem, some of which would pose new problems of their own. 
The Administration acknowledges that to ensure total and mutual 
invulnerability is beyond the scope of current technology and arms control, 
and that the success of a START proposal would be in creating the next best 
thing, namely equality of vulnerability. [see U.S. and Soviet Views Far 
Apart at Opening of Arms Talks Today, in New York Times, June 29, 1982.1 Its 
acknowledgement of this point and of the pertinence of a survivable basing 
mode to the ICBM vulnerability problem has brought it closer to the 
mainstream of arms control of the 1970s. 
Some argue that any arms control agreement based on current forces would 
be destabilizing. They argue that arms control Will limit the capabilities 
of U.S. forces and sacrifice important new programs as "bargaining chips" at 
a time when the U.S.S.R. enjoys clear strategic superiority and exhibits more 
interest in formalizing its supremacy than in promoting stability. Many of 
these critics are one-time Reagan supporters who feel that their trust in the 
Administration has been betrayed by its pursuit of an arms control agreement. 
They see START as inconsistent with earlier Administration policy that sought 
explicitly to relegate arms control policy to a status subordinate to defense 
policy (i.e., a remedial build-up). A related argument made by some is that 
the Soviet Union does not share the interest of the Western arms control 
community in promoting stability, as the Soviets goal is unchallengeable 
supremacy. 
The Administration's response is that the START proposals are consistent 
with its defense policy. Any agreement embodying the START proposals would 
still permit the modernization of the U.S. arsenal. Such an agreement, the 
Administration argues, would facilitate the primary goal of Reagan strategic 
policy by permitting the U.S. to redress deficiencies in its capabilities, 
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thus enhancing survivability and therefore deterrence, while hindering the 
Soviet Union from enhancing those areas where it currently has an edge. 
Soviet Response 
The first official Soviet response to President Reagan's May 9 speech 
announcing START was made by Soviet President Brezhnev on May 18, and it set 
the critical yet cautious tone of subsequent Soviet statements. Brezhnev 
approved of U.S. willingness to resume negotiations but was critical of 
START'S main points as "absolutely unilateral". He made oblique reference to 
the departure from SALT ("We should try to preserve everything that has been 
achieved.") and proposed adoption of a freeze on development and deployment 
of new types of strategic weapons to commence concurrently with the talks. 
Subsequently, Soviet spokesmen have portrayed the U.S. proposal a s  lopsided 
and as deliberately ignoring those systems in which the United States and its 
allies possess major strengths. They have argued that the proposal fails to 
meet the basic requirement that any agreement should observe the principle of 
equality. 
In an unexpected move, the Soviet Union made a counterproposal before the 
mid-August recess, offering to reduce strategic forces to a common ceiling of 
1,800 long-range missiles and bombers. This offer sets ceilings 20% below 
those provided for in SALT 11, and is remarkably similar to the proposal made 
by the Carter Administration in early 1977. The net effect would be to 
reduce the Soviet missile and bomber force by approximately 26% and the U.S. 
arsenal by about 7%. The proposal would not greatly reduce the number of 
warheads, however, since missiles could still be MIRVed in large numbers. 
Reportedly, the proposal also calls for curbs on Typhoon and Trident class 
ballistic missile submarines, a ban or limits on cruise missiles, and an 
extension of "confidence-building measures". The freeze on development and 
deployment of new systems proposed by the Soviets to run concurrently with 
the talks is not explicitly linked to the counterproposal. ceilings, and the 
Soviets reportedly acknowledge that some accommodation will have to be made 
on the modernization issue. 
There are competing perceptions of the significance of the Soviet proposal 
and the nature of Soviet intentions. Some analysts have interpreted the 
Soviet failure to reject the U.S. proposal out of hand a s  a sign of Soviet 
willingness to negotiate seriously; others see the counterproposal as a 
public relations ploy aimed at currying favor with public opinion in the West 
and Third World. Some have termed the Soviet counter-proposal "surprisingly 
forthcoming" and are encouraged by a stated ~ovi'et willingness to modify SALT 
I1 in the general direction envisioned by the Reagan Administration. Others 
see the Soviet proposals offering very little promise of overcoming the 
profoundly different assessments each side makes of the current strategic 
nuclear balance and what constitutes a fair agreement. 
Other Approaches to Arms Control 
In the interregnum following the demise of SALT 11, a number of proposals 
were advanced for getting arms control negotiations back on track. Critics 
of current policy have pressed various of these suggestions as alternatives 
to the Administration's START proposal. Some of the concepts might be seen 
as potential supplements to the Administration's approach, that is, as 
additional negotiating tracks. 
A sampling of other approaches includes: 
A Nuclear Weapons Freeze: There is substantial public sentiment for, and 
some congressional interest in, a freeze on strategic nuclear weapons. The 
essential point that distinguishes a freeze approach from SALT or START is 
that a freeze would cap growing numbers of nuclear weapons before proceeding 
to the more difficult task of restructuring or reducing strategic forces. 
[see CRS Issue Brief 82059: Nuclear Freeze: Arms Control Proposals, by Mark 
Lowenthal.] 
Ratify SALT G: Calls continue for the ratification of SALT 11. 
Advocates of this position argue that despite its faults, SALT 11 would 
enhance U.S. security, and has the added advantage that it has already been 
negotiated. They also note that the Administration concedes that there are 
no near-term conflicts between SALT I 1  and its program of strategic 
rearmament. [See statement of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 
Strategic Weapons Proposals: Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Nov. 3 ,  4, and 9, 1981, p.5.1 If SALT I1 were ratified, 
reductions and other Administration goals could then be effected through 
amendments to the basic agreement. However, parts of the SALT I1 Treaty have 
already expired and would require renegotiation. 
Other Reduction Proposals: Some strategic force analysts have suggested a 
graduated approach to arms cuts in the form of annual percentage reductions. 
Rep. Albert Gore, D-Tenn., has applied this concept in an elaborate scheme 
for the phased elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs. [See Congressional Record 
Mar. 22, 1982, p. H994, and Aug. 10, 1982, p. H5605.1 The Soviets have hinted 
interest in this proposal. Others would go further by eliminating ICBMs 
altogether. 
Conclude "Peripheralm Negotiations: Proponents of this option argue that 
the stability of the central strategic balance could be enhanced through 
agreements related to other areas of arms competition. They would resume 
negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, dropped when negotiations 
were close to complete; pursue ratification of treaties that the US has 
signed on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and a Threshold Test Ban; open 
bilateral negotiations on a treaty eliminating chemical weapon stockpiles 
that have not been taken up by the Reagan Administration; and assess new 
areas of arms Confrontation to consider the extent to which they might 
effectively be controlled (e.g., space-based weapon systems, especially 
antisatellite systems). 
Confidence-building Measures: Many argue that another way to make the 
central strategic balance more manageable is to take steps to increase the 
transparency and predictaSility of each side to the other. This could reduce 
fears and perceptions of threats so that crises are less likely occur and are 
more manageable when they do. Advocates of this approach argue that 
confidence-building measures are a promising option since they can result 
from informal bilateral understandings and unilateral initiatives and are 
thus not burdened by the formal and comprehensive treaty negotiation process. 
In the spring of 1982, the Reagan Administration proposed to negotiate with 
the Soviets on notification of strategic missile test launches and expanded 
exchange of strategic force data. Brezhnev has expressed a willingness to 
expand other kinds of confidence-building measures, such a s  troop movement - 
notification. Public evidence, however, has not indicated follow-ups to 
either proposal. 
ROLE OF CONGRESS 
Formally, Congress becomes involved in international agreements only after 
they have been negotiated and signed by the Executive. There are two types 
of international agreements invoking different forms of congressional 
involvement: executive agreements and treaties. The Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act requires that any agreements (other than treaties) that limit 
US forces require the approval of both the Senate and House, by a simple 
majority. ~n the case of START, an executive agreement is considered an 
unlikely form of agreement, though it was used for the SALT I interim 
agreement and was considered but dropped by President Carter for SALT 11. 
Treaties require the consent of just the Senate, by a vote of two-thirds. 
[N.B.: strictly speaking, this process of congressional advice an8 
consent does not constitute "ratification". A treaty is ratified when the 
signatories exchange instruments of ratification (generally a protocol and 
the treaty itself), which occurs after each party has given legitimacy to the 
commitment according to its own laws. In the case of the United States, 
Senate approval allows the ratification process to proceed.] 
Practically; however, Congress often takes a hand in the process much 
earlier. It can bring its influence to bear through hearings on arms control 
and strategic arms policy, through the exercise of its constitutional 
prerogatives with regard to the appointment of arms Control policy makers, 
and by granting or witheholding funds for strategic arms programs which could 
weaken or bolster the President's bargaining position in negotiations. 
Conceivably, Congress might also pass into law initiatives that would push 
the Executive toward a particular U.S. policy on strategic issues. A case in 
point is the well-known "Jackson Amendment" of 1972, which "urges and 
requestsw that any future treaty "not limit the United States to levels of 
intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the levels provided for the 
Soviet Union." 
By these means, Congress is likely to be closely involved in the START 
process. Testimony was given to Congress by U.S. negotiators after the 
first round of negotiations, a form of consu1tatio.n that will probably 
continue. The Administration is also likely to court congressional support 
as (and if) an agreement begins to look promising, for many contend that a 
major factor in SALT 11's demise was the Carter Administration's failure to 
manage adequately the domestic politics of arms control, thus losing 
congressional support. The Administration has apparently decided, however, 
not to follow occasional past practice of according formal observer status to 
members of Congress interested in following the negotiations closely. It 
has, though, indicated that it would welcome congressional visits to Geneva 
where full briefings could be provided. 
Arms control is a highly politicized issue, and if SALT I1 is any 
indication, START is likely to become a significant issue hotly debated in 
Congress and a major factor in c o n g r e S S i ~ n a l - e ~ e c ~ t i ~ e  relations. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
12/06/82 -- Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov denounced the U.S. 
Dense Pack deployment scheme for MX as a "gross 
violationn of existing arms Control agreements, which 
pledge t5e parties "not to develop additional 
stationary launching installations for intercontinental 
missiles." He also warned that the Soviet Union was 
prepared to deploy a new ICBM of equivalent capability.- 
12/02/82 -- The strategic arms reduction talks recessed at 
Geneva. 
11/26/82 -- The Soviet party newspaper Pravda charged that Dense 
Pack would violate SALT I and SALT I1 prohibitions 
on the construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. 
11/23/82 -- The Soviet news agency Tass denounced President 
Reagan's Dense Pack deployment decision as a "new 
dangerous stepn that would raise the arms race to a 
"higher, more expensive and dangerous level." 
11/22/82 -- The Administration announced that it had decided to 
deploy 100 MX missiles in the Closely Spaced or 
"Dense Packv basing scheme. In a speech announcing 
the decision, President Reagan argued that MX 
deployment would give the Soviet Union incentive to 
negotiate significant strategic arms reductions. 
The President also announced that he had proposed new 
"confidence-building measures" to the Soviet 
negotiators at Geneva. In a news conference, Defense 
Secretary Weinberger contended that the MX Dense 
Pack deployment was consistent with the terms of 
SALT 11, which prohibits the construction of 
additional fixed launchers of ICBMs. 
10/06/82 -- START negotiations resumed. 
08/12/82 -- START negotiations recessed. 
07/12/82 -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out 
S.J.Res. 212, a nuclear arms reduction 
resolution which among other things stated: 
To provide a basis for progress during the START 
negotiations, the United States shall continue 
to refrain from actions which would undercut 
the SALT I and SALT I1 agreements, provided the 
Soviet Union shows equal restraint. 
06/29/82 -- START talks between the United States and the 
Soviet Union began in Geneva. Both sides agreed 
to keep the contents of the talks confidential. 
05/31/82 -- During a Memorial Day speech, President Reagan 
announced that the START talks would begin June 
29. As regards U.S. policy on SALT compliance, 
the President said: As for existing strategic 
arms agreements, we will refrain from actions 
which undercut them so long as the Soviet 
Union shows equal restraint. 
-- The United States and the Soviet Union issued 
a joint announcement on the starting date for 
the strategic arms control negotiations. 
05/18/82 -- Soviet President Brezhnev responded to President 
Reagan's START proposal. He described Reagan's 
call for the resumption of talks as "a step in 
the right directiontt but criticized the 
specifics of the proposal as "absolutely 
unilateral in naturew. He proposed a 
U.S.-Soviet freeze on strategic weapons to take 
effect "as soon as the talks begin'' and called 
for modernization of such weapons to be "limited 
to the utmostw. 
05/11/82 --  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Secretary of State Haig said "we 
consider SALT I1 to be dead. We have so 
informed the Soviet Union." 
05/09/82 -- During a commencement address at Eureka College 
in Illinois, President Reagan announced his 
plan for strategic arms control. The President 
proposed phased reductions aimed at "the most 
destabilizing systems, the ballistic missilest1: 
-- "At the first phase, or the end of the first 
phase of START, I expect ballistic missile 
warheads, the most serious threat we face, 
to be reduced to equal levels, equal ceilings, 
at least a third below the current levels. To 
enhance stability, I would ask that no more 
than half of those warheads be land-based." 
-- "In a second phase, we'll seek to achieve an 
equal ceiling on other elements of our strategic 
nuclear forces including limits on the ballistic 
missile throwweight at less than current 
American levels." 
-- The President expressed the hope that the START 
negotiations would begin by the end of June. 
01/24/82 -- It was confirmed that the Administration had 
decided not to set a starting date on strategic 
arms reduction talks to impress upon the Soviets 
that "we're not doing business as usual a s  long 
as repression is under way in Poland." 
11/18/81 -- President Reagan announced his "Zero option" 
position for upcoming Geneva talks on 
medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. On 
strategic arms control, he said: "The United 
States proposed to open negotiations on 
strategic arms as soon as possible next year. 
I have instructed Secretary Haig to discuss 
the timing of such meetings with Soviet 
representatives.... We can and should attempt 
major qualitative and quantitative progress 
[with the goal of] truly substantial reductions 
in our strategic arsenal's." 
11/04/81 -- Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Secretary Haig commented on the 
timetable for starting the next round of SALT 
negotiations: 
---''We hope that negotiations can began as early 
as next Spring. But ... arms control negotiations 
cannot be conducted in a political vacuum." 
10/19/80 --  Governor Reagan described the SALT I1 treaty a s  
"basically flawed" because it does not reduce 
armaments and stated: "As president, I will 
immediately open negotiations on a SALT I 1 1  
treaty. My goal is to begin arms reductions. 
My energies will be directed at reducing 
destructive nuclear weaponry in the world 
-- and doing it in such a way as to protect 
fully the critical security requirements of 
our nation." 
01/03/80 -- President Carter requested that the Senate delay 
consideration of the SALT I1 treaty because 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
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